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Love and Transience in Proust  
Robbie Kubala 
	 	 	 	 	 	 ‘love is important for the philosopher, full of  	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 lessons for whoever analyzes’  
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Marcel Proust, letter to Lionel Hauser  1
Abstract 
One strand of  recent philosophical attention to Marcel Proust’s novel À la recherche du temps 
perdu, exemplified by Martha Nussbaum and Rae Langton, claims that romantic love is 
depicted in the text as self-regarding and solipsistic. I aim to challenge this reading. First, I 
demonstrate that the text contains a different view, overlooked by these recent 
interpreters, according to which love is directed at the partially knowable reality of  
another. Second, I argue that a better explanation for Proust’s narrator’s ultimate 
renunciation of  romantic love appeals not to his impossible epistemic standard for 
knowledge of  another person, but to his demanding evaluative standard for the 
permanence of  love. This interpretation takes into account the broader scope of  the 
novel, connecting with its larger themes of  lost time and the desire for stability, and is 
more charitable, connecting to familiar worries about transience and constancy in loving 
relationships. 
Introduction 
In the final volume of  Marcel Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu, the narrator, whom we 
can call Marcel, renounces romantic love in favor of  his literary vocation: ‘I intended to 
resume living in solitude . . . for the duty to write my book [le devoir de faire mon oeuvre] took 
precedence’ (VII, 295; IV, 563).  After having pursued a succession of  women – Gilberte, 2
Andrée, Oriane de Guermantes, Mlle de Stermaria, Mme Putbus’ lady’s maid, and 
intermittently and finally Albertine – Marcel’s failure to forge a lasting relationship 
intensifies his desire to create a work of  art that will endure. One of  the many questions 
 Lionel Hauser was Proust’s financial adviser; this letter of  1918 is cited in William C. Carter, Proust in 1
Love (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 55.
 The first set of  Roman and Arabic numerals refer to the volume and page number of  the recent English 2
translations published by Penguin Books in 2002: in order, Swann’s Way, trans. Lydia Davis; In the Shadow of  
Young Girls in Flower, trans. James Grieve; The Guermantes Way, trans. Mark Treharne; Sodom and Gomorrah, 
trans. John Sturrock; The Prisoner, trans. Carol Clark; The Fugitive, trans. Peter Collier, and Finding Time 
Again, trans. Ian Patterson. Page numbers for the first four volumes refer to the US editions; page numbers 
for the last three volumes refer to the UK editions, which due to copyright restriction are currently not for 
sale in the US. I have occasionally modified the translations. The second set of  Roman and Arabic 
numerals refer to the volume and page number of  the French Pléaide edition, ed. Jean-Yves Tadié (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1987–9).
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the novel raises is this: what kind of  view of  romantic love could give someone reason to 
abandon it altogether?  
	 One strand of  recent philosophical attention to the novel, exemplified by Martha 
Nussbaum and Rae Langton, has taken Proustian love as a foil for the philosopher’s own 
preferred account of  love. Marcel’s various remarks are read as comprising a coherent but 
misguided theory that we are invited to challenge on independent philosophical grounds.  3
Thus Nussbaum claims that on Proust’s view, love is nothing but ‘a rather interesting 
relation with oneself ’,  rather than a vulnerable relation to an autonomous other. 4
Similarly, for Langton, Marcel is an epistemic solipsist, believing himself  to be the only 
knowable person and treating the beloved ‘merely as a screen on which emotions can be 
conveniently projected’,  rather than opening himself  to the possibility of  mutual 5
interpretability and its concomitant alterations to his self-conception.   6
	 Here, I make two claims by way of  response. First, the text also presents a distinct, 
non-solipsistic view of  love, overlooked by these recent interpreters and ultimately 
rejected by Marcel (although perhaps not by Proust), according to which love is directed 
at the partially knowable reality of  another.  Second, the reason that Marcel does not 7
embrace this more attractive view of  love is not, as Langton and Nussbaum suggest, that 
 Nussbaum, ‘Love’s Knowledge’, in Love’s Knowledge (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3
1990), 261–85, and Langton, ‘Love and Solipsism’, in Roger Lamb (ed.), Love Analyzed (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1997), 123–52.
 Op. cit. note 3, 272.4
 Op. cit. note 3, 150.5
 The idea that Proustian love is solipsistic has not been conjured from thin air by philosophers, of  course, 6
and also finds expression in literary-critical treatments. For instance, Richard Bales claims that ‘the 
Narrator could not provide a bleaker analysis of  the nature of  love: it is an illusion, created in one’s mind 
by dint of  belief  in the abstract notion of  it’ (Proust: À la recherche du temps perdu (London: Grant & Cutler 
Ltd., 1995), 63).
 One philosopher from a different tradition who has not ignored this view is Emmanuel Levinas, who in 7
his perceptive 1947 essay ‘The Other in Proust’ points out that ‘Marcel did not love Albertine, if  love is a 
fusion with the Other, the ecstasy of  one being over the perfections of  the other, or the peace of  
possession. … But this non-love is precisely love, the struggle with what cannot be grasped (possession, 
that absence of  Albertine), her presence’ (trans. Seán Hand, in Seán Hand (ed.), The Levinas Reader 
(London: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 160–5 at 164–5). The non-solipsistic view of  love that I discuss might be 
thought of  as an elaboration of  Levinas’ brief  but suggestive remarks. 
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there can be no knowledge of  the beloved, but because love turns out to be just as 
transient as the soirées and salons that comprise his social life. As Marcel puts it in the first 
volume of  the novel, ‘love has such need to find for itself  a justification, a guarantee that it 
will last’ (I, 230; I, 218). But he discovers that there are no such guarantees, and when 
romantic love is assessed at such a demanding standard, its value naturally appears 
correspondingly minimal.  
	 Following Langton and Nussbaum, I will concentrate on Marcel’s relationship with 
Albertine, especially as recorded in ‘Le Chagrin et l’Oubli’, the opening chapter of  the 
sixth volume, Albertine disparue. But Marcel’s (and perhaps Proust’s) passion for 
generalization means that patterns recur across relationships, and so I will frequently 
draw on other moments of  the novel. One in particular calls for initial comment. ‘Un 
amour de Swann’, the novella at the center of  the first volume, Du côté de chez Swann, 
functions as an overture for the hundreds of  pages to follow, introducing the novel’s 
central motifs in compressed form, and the relationship of  Swann to Odette is explicitly 
compared with that of  Marcel to Albertine. Marcel writes that he takes an interest in 
Swann’s character ‘because of  the resemblances it offered to my own’ (I, 201; I, 191) and 
foreshadows the parallels very early on by hinting that when it comes to the anguish of  
love, ‘no one, perhaps, could have understood me as well as he’ (I, 30; I, 30).  
	 In section 1, I describe Marcel’s relationship to Albertine and explain why the 
solipsistic account of  Marcel’s renunciation of  love has been thought plausible. In section 
2, I draw attention to the non-solipsistic view of  love – undeniably present in the text, 
albeit rarely emphasized – as a relation to a partially knowable other. In section 3, I offer 
an alternative diagnosis of  Marcel’s renunciation, a diagnosis that appeals not to an 
impossible epistemic standard for knowledge of  another person but to a lofty evaluative 
standard for the permanence of  love. 
1. Love as Solipsism 
3
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	 It would be a startlingly revisionary reading of  Proust that proposed that love is 
never depicted as solipsistic.  Indeed, one of  the challenges of  interpreting Proust is that 8
such a welter of  views is to be found in the Recherche. Proust originally intended to write an 
essay, perhaps in emulation of  his early hero John Ruskin, and the novel that resulted is 
full of  general statements that can seem to have been lifted from the pages of  a treatise in 
aesthetics or epistemology. Yet these statements often contradict one another, or 
contradict an attitude expressed in the depiction of  concrete events.  One of  my 9
strategies, in highlighting the non-solipsistic view of  love, will be to show that some of  the 
maxims that purport to endorse solipsism are unintelligible in the light of  Marcel’s other 
thoughts and actions.  
	 By solipsism, Langton and Nussbaum primarily mean epistemic solipsism, the view 
that one is the only knowable person. Langton claims that Marcel is also, at least 
sometimes, a metaphysical solipsist, believing himself  to be the only person, and a moral 
solipsist, believing himself  to be the only person who matters. It is admittedly difficult to 
work out the precise logical connections between these varieties of  solipsism, but it is not 
the case that, as Langton puts it, ‘Marcel becomes an epistemological solipsist because he 
began as a moral solipsist of  a certain kind, the kind . . . who desires a person not as a 
person, but as a person to be possessed’.  For one thing, although he can be selfish and 10
 I should emphasize from the outset that while I grant that the Langton-Nussbaum view has some textual 8
support, it is notably ahistorical. A fuller treatment of  the solipsistic view would discuss some of  its 
historical antecedents, which within the French tradition alone stretch from Racine’s assumption that the 
lover’s view of  the beloved is inherently unstable to Stendhal’s theory of  crystallization, which claims that 
we love idealized fantasies rather than real people. For a brief  but helpful summary, see Alison Finch, 
‘Love, Sexuality, and Friendship’, in Richard Bales (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Proust (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 168–82. A fuller treatment of  my own transience view would similarly 
have to make reference to its own historical antecedents, from medieval French poetry to Flaubert. 
 Joshua Landy makes use of  this fact in formulating his methodology for reconstructing the views of  9
Proust from those of  his narrator Marcel: assume, for any given maxim spoken in Marcel’s voice, that 
Proust endorses it, unless there is a contradiction between maxims or between a maxim and the depicted 
events (Philosophy as Fiction: Self, Deception, and Knowledge in Proust (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 35). While I applaud Landy for attributing a greater degree of  self-awareness to Proust than 
many critics do, I am less interested to learn exactly what Proust meant (a task better suited to a literary 
scholar) than to think through the consequences of  a line of  thought present in his text. 
 Langton, ‘Love and Solipsism’, in Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification (New 10
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press), 357–81 at 373.
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jealous, Marcel does not begin as a moral solipsist: he has a deep love and non-
instrumental concern for the well-being of  his family members, especially his mother and 
grandmother, and at the time of  his early romantic encounters, ‘love had seemed to be a 
thing that was not only external, but achievable [non pas seulement extérieure, mais 
réalisable]’ (II, 509; II, 283–4). For another thing, his tendency toward epistemic solipsism 
is both chronologically and explanatorily prior: the very first paragraph of  the novel 
describes the young Marcel’s inability to discern sleep from wakefulness, foregrounding 
his quest to reach the limits of  subjectivity and emerge into an intersubjective world. And 
in love, it is Marcel’s uncertainty about whether the women he loves really are the way he 
perceives them to be that leads him to treat their qualities as mere projections and to 
believe his feelings for them to be caused by those projections.  
	 Consider Albertine, one of  a group of  petit bourgeois girls whom Marcel first 
encounters in the novel’s second volume, when he spends the summer at the seaside resort 
of  Balbec. He befriends the whole group, but his affections – after many twists and turns 
– eventually settle on Albertine in particular, although his relationship to her is inflected 
by possessiveness, jealousy, and an anxious suspicion that she is secretly enjoying lesbian 
trysts. In the fifth volume, La prisonnière, Marcel takes Albertine into his Paris apartment, 
where he can better supervise her activities, and at the start of  Albertine disparue he receives 
the news that she has fled his smothering machinations. Despite the fact that he had 
grown weary of  life with Albertine and was considering ending the affair, her flight turns 
out to occasion a fresh bout of  possessiveness and a desire to bring her back, a desire that 
persists even after he learns, several weeks later, that she has been thrown from a horse 
and killed.  
	 During this period, as throughout the novel, it is not difficult to find expressions of  
a belief  in ‘la nature subjective’ of  love, as Marcel puts it (VI, 401; IV, 17). For instance, 
there is the idea that our affective responses to the beloved are not caused by any of  her 
properties: ‘her person itself  has little to do with it; it is almost entirely concerned with the 
sequence of  emotions and anxieties which chance made us feel for her at some time or 
other in the past, and which habit has attached to her’ (VI, 400; IV, 16). Then there is the 
5
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notion that we cannot even detect the properties of  the beloved but merely project our 
own: ‘When we speak of  a woman’s “kindness”, we are probably only projecting outside 
ourselves the pleasure that we feel on seeing her’ (VI, 463; IV, 78). And finally there is the 
solipsistic conclusion: ‘The links between another person and ourselves exist only in our 
minds’ (VI, 418; IV, 34). 
	 Yet each of  these claims is called into question by others. Marcel recognizes that 
his romantic history demonstrates that he is responding to the properties of  another 
person: 
	      I could say that I might have experienced the same exclusive love for  
	      another woman, but not absolutely any other. For though Albertine,  
	      who was plump and dark, did not resemble Gilberte, who was slender  
	      and red-haired, both none the less shared the same robust health, the  
	      same sensual cheeks and the same enigmatic look.  (VI, 468; IV, 83)  11
It is significant that physical properties be included in the specification of  his ‘type’, 
because these cannot be projected in the way that personality properties, which are often 
more evaluative than descriptive, can. What feeling could Marcel project that would 
correspond to an experience of  Gilberte as having red hair, as opposed to dark hair? As 
one early critic puts it, in all the relationships of  the novel, ‘the lover’s fantasies are 
accompanied by more or less objective characterizations of  the loved one’.  12
	 Not only does love respond to the properties of  the beloved; it can even hone our 
ability to detect them, as in a passage when Marcel is getting to know the band of  jeune 
filles en fleur:  
	      Loving sharpens discernment and our power to make distinctions.  
	      [Aimer aide à discerner, à différencier]… When I chatted with one of  the  
	      girls, I noticed that the outline of  her individuality, original and unique, 
	      was ingeniously drawn and ruthlessly imposed upon me as much by the 
 Marcel claims, in this context, that everyone falls in love with a certain type, ‘although the type may be 11
loosely defined’ (VI, 468; IV, 84), but this is contradicted elsewhere. In Le Temps retrouvé, there is a lengthy 
passage discussing men who love women ‘qui n’étaient pas leur genre’ (VII, 331; IV, 599), and the final 
sentence of  ‘Un amour de Swann’ reminds us that Odette was not a woman of  Swann’s type. For further 
discussion, see Landy, op. cit. note 9, 28–32.
 Leo Bersani, Marcel Proust: The Fictions of  Life and of  Art (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 12
1965), 127–8.
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	      modulations of  her voice as by the shifting expressions of  her face. (II,  
	      486-7; II, 261) 
The language is worth some attention: not only is there no suggestion of  projection, but 
the woman’s individuality positively imposes itself  on Marcel, in a sensory impression that 
commands his assent. Gilles Deleuze emphasizes this feature of  Proustian love: ‘To fall in 
love is to individualize someone by the signs he bears or emits’.  Although presumably 13
there are other relations that facilitate the individuation of  others, there is no indication 
that love entails projecting one’s own signs onto another.    
	 Finally, other passages call solipsism in question altogether, proposing not only that 
a lover can know the beloved through her properties, but that those properties are the 
means by which her individual essence becomes visible. In the early stages of  their 
relationship, Swann is enchanted by everything about Odette, including her dubious 
aesthetic tastes, which are ‘so many particular traits by which the woman’s essence 
[l’essence de cette femme] appeared to him, became visible’ (I, 254; I, 242). Marcel, 
encountering Albertine in Balbec, echoes this view: ‘The object of  our anxious 
investigations is her essence, not to be confused with peculiarities of  character [plus essentiel 
que ces particularités de caractère]’ (II, 473-4; II, 249). Considering her glittering blue eyes, 
what he is ‘most aware of  is that she herself  lies behind them, with her desires, her likes 
and dislikes, the power of  her inscrutable and inexhaustible will [volonté]’ (II, 376; II, 152). 
As it happens, this view of  love is not so far from one peak of  the contemporary 
philosophical landscape: it resembles nothing so much as David Velleman’s Kantian view, 
on which the immediate object of  love is the manifest person, with her sensorily available 
qualities, who disarms our emotional defenses and whose personhood we see through those 
qualities.  Though the immediate object of  love is a person’s particular traits, the proper 14
 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, trans. Richard Howard (London: Continuum, 2008), 5.13
 Velleman, ‘Love as a Moral Emotion’, Ethics 109 (1999), 338–74 at 371.14
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object of  love is the person’s ‘intelligible essence’, her ‘rational will’.  Read in this light, 15
Marcel’s use of  the term ‘will’ is striking.  16
	 Yet if  Marcel’s end is Kantian, his means are not. Langton is surely right to point 
out that Marcel evinces an invasive desire to possess Albertine, squirreling her away in his 
apartment and keeping watch on all her movements. Langton describes Marcel’s mental 
process as follows:  
	      First there was the dim awareness of  another life. She exists. Then: If   
	      she exists, I can know her. I want to know her. Then: If  I can know  
	      her, I can possess her, since knowing is possessing. I want to possess her. 	 	   
	      Discovery: I cannot possess her. Marcel performs a gruesome modus  
	      tollens. I cannot possess her. Therefore I cannot know her. Therefore  
	      she does not exist. And he contents himself  with this conclusion, instead  
	      of  treating it as the reductio of  his strategy, his equation of  knowledge  
	      and possession.  17
This is a compelling diagnosis of  Marcel’s error, if  we can allow ourselves to call it that. 
But I will suggest in the third section that it is not the best interpretation of  why he 
renounces love. My aim in the next section, however, is to present the non-solipsistic view 
of  love that Marcel considers and even acts upon.  
2. Love as Vulnerability 
	 Nussbaum, raising the issue of  solipsism, writes that ‘the novel as a whole 
discourages optimism about knowledge of  another within personal love’.  I want first to 18
deny this claim, by insisting that Marcel in fact knows a lot about Albertine, before going 
on to make the stronger point that the text also depicts love as the relation of  mutual 
openness and vulnerability that recent philosophers so very much want it to be.  
 Ibid., 344.15
 This is not the only similarity between Kant and Proust. In a recent paper, Richard Moran argues that 16
Proust shares the Kantian idea that beautiful objects make normative demands on their beholders, albeit 
without Kant’s insistence on universal agreement as criterial of  the judgment of  beauty (‘Kant, Proust, 
and the Appeal of  Beauty’, Critical Inquiry 38 (2012): 298–329).
 Op. cit. note 10, 376.17
 Op. cit. note 3, 274 n. 18.18
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	 We have already seen that Marcel’s love of  Albertine allows him to make precise 
discriminations about her physical properties.  But he also learns quite a bit about her 19
personality. He discovers that she is ‘très intelligente’ (II, 464; II, 239), that she has ‘lively 
and slightly provincial qualities’ (II, 508; II, 282), and, after she spurns his physical 
advances, that she is more virtuous than he had hypothesized (II, 518; II, 292). He is also 
familiar with quite specific habits that are only revealed over time, such as ‘her habit of  
using a single action to give pleasure to more than one person’ (V, 361; III, 892) and ‘the 
alacrity with which she seized upon any opportunity of  pleasure’ (V, 362; III, 892). That 
Albertine is simultaneously a hedonist and an inveterate people-pleaser, ready to sacrifice 
her own aims in order to satisfy the desires of  others, is a consequential piece of  
psychological knowledge, perhaps not even transparent to Albertine herself. Although at 
times Marcel is tempted to interpret Albertine according to the ‘idée fixe’ that Odette 
represents (IV, 201; III, 200), he resists this parallelism by recalling the ‘abyss between 
Albertine, a girl from quite a good bourgeois family, and Odette, a cocotte sold by her 
mother from an early age’ (IV, 229; III, 228). Again, love enables him to make 
distinctions, to individualize, to make him less blind to the reality of  another.  
	 Beyond this, Marcel acknowledges that he and Albertine have developed over time: 
‘if  I had changed my attitude towards her, she herself  had also changed’ (VI, 469; IV, 84). 
She speaks in a more lofty register (V, 11; III, 527) and cultivates her tastes (V, 159; III, 
682). But not only has she changed; she has changed because of  him. His influence 
transforms her into ‘that divine thing [cette chose divine]: a person with whom I could 
discuss everything’ (VI, 464; IV, 79). He even recognizes that this has implications for the 
solipsistic view of  love: ‘this long complaint of  the soul which believes that it lives enclosed 
within itself  is only superficially a monologue, since the echoes of  reality cause it to 
 One charming instance of  this is Marcel’s early inability to remember where Albertine’s beauty mark is: 19
‘Just as a phrase of  Vinteuil that had delighted me in the sonata, and which my memory kept moving 
from the andante to the finale, until the day when, with the score in hand, I was able to find it and localize 
it where it belonged, in the scherzo, so the beauty mark, which I had remembered on her cheek, then on 
her chin, came to rest forever on her upper lip, just under her nose’ (II, 456–7; II, 232). 
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change tack’ (VI, 466; IV, 82). What seemed like a monologue turns out to be a genuine 
dialogue in which Marcel and Albertine change each other over time. 
	 For he himself  is also open to being changed by her. We see this in minor, everyday 
activities, as when Albertine helps him to select a dinner menu (III, 383; II, 681) or when 
they engage in lengthy conversations about Hardy and Dostoevsky (V, 348–52; III, 878–
83). Their shared love makes him reevaluate his preferences: although Marcel finds a 
certain Barbedienne bronze hideous, Albertine’s awe of  it, as he puts it, ‘was transferred 
to me in the form of  an admiration which, since it came from Albertine, was important to 
me, . . . since I loved Albertine’ (V, 159; III, 682). This openness is also evident in the first 
stages of  Swann’s love for Odette, when Swann’s goal is the ‘closeness of  two hearts 
[rapprochement des coeurs]’ (I, 204; I, 193): ‘now that he loved Odette, to feel what she felt, to 
try to share but a single soul between the two of  them [tâcher de n’avoir qu’une âme à eux deux 
lui était si doux], was so sweet to him that he sought to enjoy the things she liked’ (I, 255; I, 
242–3). Here we find an expression of  the idea, common in the recent philosophical 
literature, that loving gives one reason to make another’s ends one’s own, even if  one 
would not otherwise value those ends.  This applies not just to objects, as with the 20
Barbedienne bronze, but to people. Although Swann is much more refined than the 
Verdurin ‘clan’ to which Odette belongs, he tries ‘to attribute real merits to it’ (I, 256; I, 
243), even though ‘the qualities that he believed to be intrinsic to the Verdurins were 
merely the reflection of  the pleasures he enjoyed in their house because of  his love for 
Odette’ (I, 257; I, 244). This is the kind of  lighting up of  the lover’s world that, in more 
recent work, Langton has described as projection going well.  21
	 In love, as Marcel writes, we invest in another person ‘such possibilities of  causing 
us pain and joy’ (I, 244; I, 232). In the face of  all the pain that love causes him, a retreat 
to solipsism, such as Langton envisages, could seem to offer palpable relief. Yet the reason 
 See, for two otherwise quite opposed perspectives, Niko Kolodny, ‘Love as Valuing a Relationship’, 20
Philosophical Review 112 (2003), 135–89, and Harry Frankfurt, The Reasons of  Love (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2004).
 Langton, ‘Projected Love’, in Susan Wolf  and Christopher Grau (eds.), Understanding Love: Philosophy, 21
Film, and Fiction (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 141–62 at 148. 
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Marcel does not discover the truth about Albertine’s sexual desires is not her intrinsic 
unknowability, but something much more prosaic: his jealousy of  her. ‘If  only I had seized 
the time before she knew I was jealous of  her to ask her the things I wanted to know’, he 
laments (V, 49; III, 566). Solipsism seems to be an attempt at a profound rationalization 
of  a more commonplace experience rather than a settled epistemological view. Swann, 
whose character is supposed to resemble Marcel’s own, is not anxious about the prospect 
of  solipsism, after all, but afflicted by run-of-the-mill sexual jealousy.   
3. Love as Transience 
	 One safe claim to make at this point is that there is a tension between the two (at 
least) views of  love depicted in the text. The critic Leo Bersani, in what remains one of  
the best commentaries on the novel, puts it more forcefully: ‘There is a certain 
contradiction between Marcel’s exasperated sense of  constantly projecting the same 
desires on an elusive reality with which he can never establish an authentic contact, and 
the narrator’s portrayal of  his responsiveness to particular situations’.  In her first paper on 22
Proust, Nussbaum acknowledges the ‘unresolved contradictions’ pertaining to Proust’s 
treatment of  love,  yet her later work retreats from this admission, arguing instead that 23
‘the novel as a whole . . . appears to endorse Marcel’s solipsistic conclusion’.  24
	 In the face of  this tension, we are left with several answers to the question with 
which we began: what does Marcel believe about romantic love that leads him to 
abandon its promises? Langton’s explanation is that he equates possession with 
knowledge, only to conclude that both are impossible. A more deflationary account could 
suppose, as I hinted above, that the narrator’s maxims represent a rationalization, taking 
peculiar features of  his own psychology (in particular, a controlling jealousy) and 
generalizing them into universal truths. The deflationary explanation might have some 
 Op. cit. note 12, 122.22
 Nussbaum, ‘Fictions of  the Soul’, in Love’s Knowledge (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 23
1990), 245–60 at 257.
 Op. cit. note 3, 274 n. 18.  24
11
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plausibility were Marcel a real person, but in a densely plotted literary work, one can 
reasonably hope for something more compelling. I suggest a different approach: Marcel’s 
deepest fear is not solipsism but impermanence, and it is his discovery that even his 
feelings for Albertine can ebb away that finally pushes him toward the less transient realm 
of  literary creation.  
	 For one thing, it is not as though solipsism is a late-breaking possibility for Marcel. 
He has flirted with it from his earliest experiences of  love. He describes the attraction of  
the view at the time when he was an adolescent playing with Gilberte: ‘At the Champs-
Élysées I had had an inkling, which since those days had become clearer to me, that when 
we are in love with a woman all we are doing is projecting onto her a state of  our own 
self ’ (II, 414; II, 189). Already, his ‘notion of  love had undergone a change’ (II, 503; II, 
278) from a belief  in the possibility of  contact with another person to a belief  in ‘the 
purely subjective nature [le caractère purement subjectif] of  the phenomenon of  love’ (II, 40; I, 
459). What is a discovery is that even his feelings for Albertine are transient and that he 
can outlast them. Albertine is portrayed as ‘the great love of  [his] life’ (II, 493; II, 268), 
the subject of  his ‘grand amour’ (III, 389; II, 688), and ‘ce plus vaste amour’ for which ‘all 
[his] previous loves had been mere, slight essays’ (V, 231; III, 757). And yet at various 
points, both before and after her death, he finds that he no longer feels love for Albertine, 
that he no longer experiences joy and suffering because of  her. His explanation for this 
has nothing to do with solipsism: ‘it is because memories do not remain true for ever, and 
because life itself  is made up of  the endless renewal of  cells, that love is not eternal’ (VI, 
557; IV, 172–3). Given the transience of  his love, not just for Albertine but for his adored 
grandmother, the only reasonable course of  action is to transcribe that feeling into a work 
of  art, thereby producing ‘an acquisition of  lasting value for all human beings’ (VII, 212; 
IV, 482). After all, ‘nothing can last unless it is generalized [rien ne peut durer qu’en devenant 
général]’ (VII, 214; IV, 484).  
	 To be sure, the worry about transience is not a late discovery, either. But Marcel’s 
expectations of  love’s permanence are curiously lofty. Even with respect to Gilberte, his 
first romantic interest, Marcel is anxious about the duration of  his love:  
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	      I detested the thought that one day I might have these same feelings for 	  
	      someone else, as this deprived me not only of  Gilberte, but also of  my  
	      love and my pain, the very love and pain through which, as I wept, I  
	      tried to grasp the real Gilberte, though I was obliged to admit they did  
	      not belong to her in particular, but would sooner or later devolve to  
	      some other woman. (II, 186-7; I, 600) 
The worry here is not solipsism – he does not fear that he cannot grasp the real Gilberte – 
but transience: Marcel could only accept that his feelings were real if  they were 
permanent. And indeed, the state of  affairs he fears comes to pass, when two years later 
he reaches ‘a state of  almost complete indifference toward Gilberte’: 
	      I would reflect sadly that the love one feels, insofar as it is love for a  
	      particular person, may not be a very real thing, since, although an  
	      association of  pleasant or painful fancies may fix it for a time on a  
	      woman, and even convince us that she was its necessary cause, the fact  
	      is that if  we consciously or unconsciously outgrow those associations,  
	      our love, as though it was a spontaneous growth, a thing of  our own  
	      making, revives and offers itself  to another woman. (II, 221; II, 3) 
The metaphysical anxiety here is not that others are not real, but that love isn’t, more 
precisely love of  particular people. Marcel later says, ‘only my love, dedicated to different 
beings, had lasted’ (VII, 211; IV, 481), but here he is referring to love more generally, as 
an affective disposition, and not to particular instances of  love that have determinate 
objects. Every particular instance of  love is transient: feelings always fade, whether 
because a relationship ends or the beloved passes away. If  one can so easily love again, 
and can know that, what kind of  attitude should one take to one’s current love?  
	 This concern should not be thought unique to Marcel. In an illuminating recent 
discussion, Dan Moller tries to make sense of  the phenomenon of  resilience in the face of  
the death of  loved ones.  Social psychologists have found that although of  course spouses 25
and partners initially grieve, they very quickly adapt to loss; the vast majority return to 
baseline metrics of  well-being within two months, and one study reported that fully half  
 Moller, ‘Love and Death’, Journal of  Philosophy 104 (2007): 301–16.25
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of  participants did not display even mild depression.  As Marcel puts it, ‘in this world 26
where everything wears out, where everything perishes, there is one thing that collapses 
and is more completely destroyed than anything else, and leaves fewer traces than beauty 
itself: and that is grief ’ (VI, 656; IV, 270).  
	 This is murky territory, as Moller’s dialectic brings out. Many people are surprised 
at the empirical results and suspect that people are not properly mourning the death of  
their loved ones. That insufficient grieving in turn seems to indicate that ‘the one suffering 
the loss never valued the object sufficiently in the first place.’  At the same time, it seems 27
foolish to claim that rapid resilience reflects a prior absence of  any concern for the 
beloved; rather, the best explanation for the phenomenon would point to the powerful 
adaptive mechanisms that we possess for coping with loss. Still, the adaptive explanation 
does not entirely assuage the uncomfortable reaction to these findings, and the worry 
remains that the beloved does not ‘possess the kind of  importance’ that we thought he or 
she had.  Moller’s discussion ends inconclusively: because grief  can be overcome more 28
easily than our judgment of  the importance of  others would lead us to believe, our 
embrace of  the phenomenon of  resilience ‘should be an uneasy one at best’.  29
	 Marcel clearly falls into the camp of  those who are unswayed by the adaptive 
explanation, and this reaction makes more sense if  we attribute to him the conception of  
love as a vulnerable relation to an independent other. For if  love is merely an interesting 
relation to oneself, and we construct others according to our imaginative whims and 
desires, then why wouldn’t one celebrate the brevity of  grief ? That Marcel is troubled by 
the transience of  le chagrin et l’oubli suggests that his fear that the love of  particular people 
is unreal is downstream of  his demanding standards for love’s permanence, not his belief  
 See George A. Bonnano, Judith Tedlie Moskowitz, Anthony Papa, and Susan Folkman, ‘Resilience to 26
Loss in Bereaved Spouses, Bereaved Parents, and Bereaved Gay Men’, Journal of  Personality and Social 
Psychology 88 (2005): 827–43 and Sidney Zisook, Martin Paulus, Stephen R. Schuchter, and Lewis L. Judd, 
‘The Many Faces of  Depression Following Spousal Bereavement’, Journal of  Affective Disorders 45 (1997): 
85–95, both cited in Moller op. cit. note 25, 302.
 Op. cit. note 25, 305.27
 Ibid., 308.28
 Ibid., 313.29
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that particular people are unknowable. In brief, Marcel renounces love because he 
discovers that it cannot survive the onslaught of  time. 
	 In closing, I will illustrate two more interpretive benefits of  highlighting this 
concern with transience. First, Marcel’s desire for permanence manifests also in a desire 
that his love for a particular person appear necessary. Just before he becomes involved 
with Albertine for a second time, Marcel pursues Mlle de Stermaria, who stands him up 
at dinner on the Íle du Bois. He tells himself  that, ‘had circumstances been very slightly 
different, my love might have directed itself  elsewhere’ and that ‘it was therefore not – as I 
was so anxious, so needed to believe – absolutely necessary [nécessaire] and 
predestined’ (III, 390; III, 688). If  a particular relationship can be necessary, then, 
according to Marcel, it is less likely to be transient (note also that he declines to project 
inevitability onto the relationship, though that would seem to be more soothing to him). 
After Albertine dies, Marcel reflects sadly that his love for her ‘was not necessary 
[nécessaire], not only because it could have happened with Mlle de Stermaria, but even 
without that, as I came to know it better, and started to find that it seemed too similar to 
what it had been for other women’ (VI, 470; IV, 85). If  his love for Albertine is not 
unique, then it can be replaced some day.  
	 Second, Marcel’s worry about transience applies even to knowledge. As he comes 
to know Albertine in Balbec, he reflects: 
	      To achieve accurate knowledge of  others, if  such a thing were possible,  
	      we could only ever arrive at it through the slow and unsure recognition  
	      of  our own initial optical inaccuracies. However, such knowledge is not  
	      possible: for, while our vision of  others is being adjusted, they, who are  
	      not made of  mere brute matter, are also changing; we think we have  
	      managed to see them more clearly, but they shift. (II, 453; II, 229)  
The first sentence of  this passage almost sounds like something out of  Iris Murdoch: 
loving and accurate knowledge of  others is possible only through a gradual removal of  
our needy and selfish distortions. Of  course, for Marcel, such knowledge turns out not to 
be possible. Yet his explanation is noteworthy: we cannot know others not because they 
are in principle unknowable (which Marcel does not, I have argued, actually believe), or 
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even because our possessive desires impede our investigations, but because they are so 
mercurial. The changeability of  others means that our knowledge of  them can never 
catch up to the way they are. Yes, Marcel’s jealousy is also an impediment to knowing 
Albertine – he never does learn whether she has lesbian affairs, after all – but it is not the 
primary obstacle.  
	 Even before his great affair with Albertine, Marcel knows how he could get himself  
to abandon love: ‘We should be forever cured of  our romanticism were we willing, in 
order to think of  the one we love, to try to be the person we shall be once we no longer 
love them’ (IV, 137; III, 135). The cure is not solipsism but simply the knowledge that we 
can outlast love. The cure becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, since Marcel becomes 
someone who no longer loves Albertine, and as it turns out, he did not even need to try. 
Forgetting, the disruption of  old habits, and other ‘adaptive’ mechanisms do the work for 
him. He is entirely cured of  his romanticism.  
4. Conclusion 
	 I have drawn one interpretive thread through the tangled skein of  Proust’s novel, 
attempting to show that it is both sturdier and more attractive than the thread of  
solipsism. To some degree, as should already be apparent, the contradictions of  the novel 
make it difficult to sustain any one settled reading.  Yet I believe that my interpretation 30
takes into account the broader scope of  the novel, connecting with its larger themes of  
 Again, Bersani is perceptive about this: ‘The only way we can miss the point about Albertine is to read 30
the novel as if  there were any one, exclusive point to be made about her’ (Op. cit. note 12, 137).
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lost time and the desire for stability, and that it is more charitable.  Rather than convict 31
Marcel (or even Proust, as Langton and Nussbaum do) of  a solipsistic error akin to that of  
Bertrand Russell’s sense-datum theory, emphasizing Marcel’s need for constancy in love 
renders more intelligible his ultimate renunciation of  it. Surely all of  us who have 
experienced love have, from time to time, found ourselves searching for guarantees that it 
will last. For love, like beauty, in Stendhal’s memorable phrase, offers only a promise of  
happiness.  The question facing the lover is whether to act on that promise, as many of  32
us do, or to suspect it of  falsity, as Marcel does.  33
 Any interpretation of  Proust is bound to run up against passages that are simply mystifying, however, 31
and so there are limits to how charitable a reading can be. One such passage comes from the final 
paragraph of  the opening chapter of  Albertine disparue: ‘When I had understood the difference that there 
was between the importance of  her person and her actions for me as opposed to for others, implying that 
my love was less a love for her than a love within me, I could have drawn diverse conclusions from this 
subjective character of  my love’ (VI, 522; IV, 137). As I see it, the implication just doesn’t follow. Unless 
Marcel is imagining that loving someone entails a Kantian demand for universal agreement as to her 
lovability, I can see no reason why he should not positively celebrate a state of  affairs in which the beloved 
seems more important to him than she does to others; such a state of  affairs is, I take it, partially 
constitutive of  love. And even if  he took the Kantian line, there is no reason for him to think that this 
difference of  importance in any way implies that he does not love Albertine. Such reasoning would seem, 
even more than any kind of  solipsism, to be a reductio of  the whole notion of  love. 
 Alexander Nehamas makes much of  this phrase in Only a Promise of  Happiness: The Place of  Beauty in a 32
World of  Art (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007). He also draws attention to the view 
of  love as vulnerability in Proust, focusing on the relationship between Swann and Odette, though he does 
not develop the point further with respect to Proust: ‘I willingly give you power over myself  emotionally, 
ethically, and intellectually, trusting you not to exploit it. By becoming vulnerable in that way, I put my 
identity at serious risk because I have no way of  telling how our relationship will ultimately affect me and 
whether it will be for good or bad – and neither do you’ (57).
 My greatest debt in writing this paper is to Philip Kitcher, for his thoughtful comments and generous 33
encouragement. I am also grateful to Lydia Goehr and Elisabeth Ladenson for helpful discussion. Earlier 
versions of  this paper were delivered at the Love’s Passion Workshop at the University of  Hertfordshire 
(September 2014), the Columbia Journal of  Literary Criticism Seminar Series (March 2015), the Felician 
Ethics Conference (April 2015), and the British Society for Aesthetics Conference (September 2015). I am 
particularly indebted to Gregory Currie, Catherine Elgin, and Jonathan Gilmore for their perceptive and 
probing questions on that last occasion. 
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